DO THE PARTIES OR THE PEOPLE OWN
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS?
RICHARD L. HASEN'

The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review kindly
asked me to comment, in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones,' on the question:
"Should courts protect political parties in the two-party system?" In
Jones, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional Proposition
198, a California voter initiative establishing a "blanket primary" that
allowed voters, regardless of their party affiliation, to vote for any
party's candidate in a primary election. For example, under a blanket
primary a voter registered as a Democrat or Independent could vote
for a Republican gubernatorial candidate to run in the general
election. The Court held that the blanket primary violated the
parties' First Amendment rights "by forcing political parties to
associate uith those who do not share their beliefs."'
Assuming that the term "political parties" in the Law Review's
question refers to political party organizations,3 my answer is that
courts generally should not protect the two major political parties, the
Democrats and Republicans, except from interference in each party's
internal governance and from one party's attempt to gain partisan
advantage over the other. On the other hand, courts should protect
minor political parties. In the specific context of Jones, I argue that
the major parties should not have been allowed to block a voter
initiative establishing a blanket primary but that the minor parties
probably should be constitutionally exempt from participating in it.
I begin Part I with a summary of my argument from an earlier
t Professor and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School.
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120 S.Ct. 2402 (2000).
Id. at 2414. I will refer to this right not to associate as a right to "party
autonomy." See Cal. Democratic Party v.Jones, 169 F.3d 646, app. at 659 n.28 (9th Cir.
1999) (stating that Professor Bruce Cain's greatest concern is protecting "party
autonomy"), riv'd, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).

j It could alternatively refer to the party-in-government or the party-in-theelctorate, as explained in Part I.B below.
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article that the major political parties usually do not deserve or need
protection from the courts, although they indeed receive such
protection.4 My prior argument contended that the state should not
be allowed to defend a law infringing upon the First Amendment
rights of minor parties or independent candidates by claiming that
such a law protects "the two-party system."
My prior argument does not resolve Jones, however, because in
Jones the two major parties advanced their own claims to First
Amendment protection from the state. The Supreme Court in Jones
recognized the major parties' First Amendment right to autonomy,
giving the parties the last word on the form of political primaries used
to pick party nominees to run in the general election.' I argue that
Jones was decided incorrectly.
Although parties have a First
Amendment right to control their internal affairs, primaries are not
internal party affairs. Rather, primaries are a means for voters to
structure the electoral process by winnowing down candidates to a list
of finalists to run in the general election. Voters through the initiative
process or the state legislature should be allowed to dictate the form
of that winnowing process, and they may reasonably choose the form
of a blanket primary, a form which likely produces more moderate
candidates to run in the general election.
After exploring the relationship between voters and party
organizations in the current electoral system, I debunk a number of
arguments that a blanket primary infringes on the First Amendment
rights of major party organizations. My argument does not mean that
states inevitably will adopt blanket primaries or other anti-party
measures; major parties remain potent, perhaps the most potent,
political forces in each state and their views often will carry the day in
political battles, such as battles over the form of a primary.
In contrast to Part I, Part II explains that courts should generally
protect minor parties from state regulation.
Minor party
organizations lack the structural and legal advantages enjoyed by the
major political parties and need judicial protection as "discrete and
insular minorities" to preserve their distinctive message and mission.
The state also has less of a reason to regulate minor political parties.
Finally, minor parties serve an important electoral function in raising
4 Richard L. Hasen, Entrenchingthe Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should
Not Allow
the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicansfrom PoliticalCompetition, 1997 Sup. CT.
REv. 331.
5 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2408 (stating that a party's First Amendment right
to limit
control of its decisions is most important when selecting a nominee).
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issues not otherwise considered by major party candidates.!
Ultimately, the question whether courts should protect major
parties' autonomy in elections reduces to a question of who controls
the electoral process, major party organizations or the people. My
vote is with the people, and I therefore fully concur with the claim
that my position is a populist or progressive one. 7
I. THE CASE AGAINST COURT PROTECTION OF MAJOR
PARTIES AND THE "TWO-PARTY SYSTEM"
A. The Conventional W isdom on the Benefits of the Two-Party System
and the Supreme Court'sEmbraceof That Wisdoms
In 1942, political scientist E.E. Schattschneider remarked that
"modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties."'
Since that time, American political scientists dubbed the "responsible
party government scholars" have concurred that strong political
parties are indispensable to democratic government. '° They see
" The Brennan Center Brief similarly distinguished major and minor political
parties' right to party autonomy. Brief for the Brennan Center forJustice at New York
University School of Law as Amicus Curiaein Support of Neither Party, Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000) (No. 99-401), available at http://
-i.brennancenter.org/resources/downloads/CADem.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2000)
[hereinafter Brennan Center Brief]. The Center's analysis differs from my analysis
here. The Brennan Center urged the Court to balance the major parties' "real"
autonomy interest with state efforts to "involv[e] the entire electorate in the process of
selecting those who will serve as government officials." Id. at 8; see also id. at 22 ("The
state has a compelling interest in fostering participation by the governed (i.e., adding
to rather than subtracting from the totality of First Amendment activity in California
politics) in elections that determine who will be their governors."). I argue that the
major parties have no right to party autonomy in public affairs like primaries, even
though they haie First Amendment rights in conducting their internal affairs.
My position on court protection of minor political parties essentially agrees with
the Brennan Center's position, see id. at 8 ("The lack of a compelling interest in
opening the nomination process of minor parties to outsiders, coupled with the
enhanced interest in autonomy enjoyed by ideologically defined minor parties,
renders the involuntary application of open or blanket primaries to such parties
unconstitutional."), though I am a bit tentative about the result in Jones and am not
cominced that the blanket primary undermines minor parties' autonomy.
7 So' Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of
Political Parties: A
Rtav,.ssntnt of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 775, 785-87 (2000)
(commenting that modern-day progressives favor state initiatives which reduce the
significance of parties in elections).
Parts I.A and I.B draw upon my more extended discussion of these issues in
Hasen, supranote 4.
E1 SCHATSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT
E.E.
1 (1942).
o S, , .g., V.O. KEl',JR., POLrCS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 9 (5th ed. 1964)
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political parties, and the American two-party system in particular, as
promoting three important interests.
First, they argue that the two-party system promotes political
stability." Under this theory, the two-party system creates extremely
large coalitions embodied by the parties. The parties as coalitions are
able to accommodate a large number of diverse groups and
viewpoints without being overly influenced by any one of them.
Strong parties also make government more accountable by allowing
parties to take the credit for positive government output and blame
for negative output. Lastly, political stability results from both parties
gravitating toward the center to attract the median voter.
Second, they argue that the two-party system minimizes the power of
factions.2 If strong parties form encompassing coalitions that take into
account the views of many interest groups, weak political parties allow
elected officials to be swayed by interest groups pursuing narrow
agendas. Factionalism not only undermines political stability, but it
also leads to government gridlock and causes voters to lose confidence
in the democratic system.
Finally, responsible party government scholars declare that the
party system provides an important voting cue for voters.'3 As Larry
Sabato explains, "party affiliation provides a useful cue for voters,
particularly the least informed and interested, who can use party as a
shortcut or substitute for interpreting issues and events they may little

("[Parties] perform the function of the articulation of the interests and aspirations of a
substantial segment of the citizenry, usually in ways contended to be promotive of the
national weal."). The belief received its most explicit expression in the American
Political Science Association (APSA) report, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System:
A Report of the Committee on PoliticalParties. The APSA report was originally published as
a supplement to volume 44, number 3 (1950) of the American PoliticalScience Review,
and made recommendations aimed at strengthening the party' system such as
increasing Congressional terms to four years. See Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Toward a More

Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on PoliticalParties,44 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 75 (Supp. 1950) (arguing that lengthening Representatives' term to four years
would "promote legislative-executive party solidarity" by "synchronizing the terms of
Representative and President").
1 For a further discussion of the political stability theory, see the sources cited in
Hasen, supra note 4, at 347-48.
12 For additional insight into the antifactionalism benefit of the two-party system,
see the sources cited in id. at 349.
13 For further elaboration on the voting cue argument, see the sources cited
in id.
at 349-50; see also Persily & Cain, supra note 7, at 787 ("A polity without parties places a
greater cognitive burden on individual voters and weakens the collective responsibility
of political agents.").
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comprehend."'"
Voters do not need to know anything about
candidates besides their partisan affiliation in order to make a roughcut guess about each candidate's politics. Studies consistently have
shown that Democratic politicians are more liberal and Republican
politicians more conservative on a host of issues.'5
As I explain in Part I.B below, the responsible party government
scholarship described above has been roundly criticized for its failure
to provide either empirical support for the first two claims or general
normative justification for favoring the two-party system. The theory is
especially vulnerable to criticism because it fails to take into account
dramatic changes in the nature of political campaigns since the 1960s.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has proven itself quite enamored
of the responsible party government position. Although earlier cases
recognized that "[t]here is, of course, no reason why two parties
should retain a permanent monopoly on the right to have people vote
for or against them,"'t the Court has moved steadily toward favoring a
two-party duopoly. In the political patronage cases" and in a case
involving political gerrymandering,"' dissenting and concurring
Supreme Court justices endorsed the concept that the state could
promote the two-party system.
Supreme Court support for the two-party system reached majority
status in 1997 when the Court decided Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New

1 L.RRYJ.

SABATO, THE PARTYS JUST BEGUN: SHAPING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR
AMERICA's FUTURE 8 (1988).
0' For a summary of the evidence, see JOHN H. ALDRICH, Wi PARTIES? THE
ORIGIN AND TRANSFO\LUXTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 169-78 (1995). The
voting cue argument is in tension ith the political stability argument that the twoparty system produces nonideological parties tending toward the political center.
Responsible part), government scholars argue that there is enough room for debate at
the political center for "tame ideological competition" between the parties. Hasen,
wpra note 4, at 350.
,,.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
7 Se,;
r.g., Rutan v.Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 106 (1990) (Scalia,
J.,
dissenting) ("It is self-evident that eliminating patronage will significantly undermine
party discipline; and that as party discipline wanes, so uill the strength of the two-party
%jstem."); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 528 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(contending that the use of patronage to fill various positions builds "party loyalty" and
avoids part), factionalism and splintering); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 382 (1976)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (claiming that patronage hiring practices contribute to the
strong government interests in encouraging and strengthening stable political parties).
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(-The preservation and health of our political institutions.., depends to no small
extent on the continued vitality of our two-party system.").
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Party.'9
Timmons concerned the question whether the state of
Minnesota could prevent a minor party from endorsing the
Democratic Party's nominee for the state legislature. 2 ' That practice,
called "fusion," is a tactic minor parties use to increase their
popularity and leverage their political power in the few jurisdictions,
like New York, that permit it.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota's
antifusion law. Among other arguments,2' the Court accepted the
state's argument that "political stability is best served through a
healthy two-party system.
The Court remarked that the state may
enact election regulations that "temper the destabilizing effects of
party splintering and excessive factionalism. 2 3 Six Justices signed this
opinion, and a seventh was willing to entertain the 2argument
in a case
4
properly.
presented
was
issue
the
believed
he
where
B.

Why the MajorPartiesNeitherDeserve nor Need
Special ConstitutionalProtection

Current responsible party government scholars and the Supreme
Court that has adopted their viewpoint are stuck in something of a
time warp back to the 1950s, when Schattschneider's ideas became
mainstream orthodoxy. Alternatively, they are perhaps stuck in a time
and space warp to early twentieth-century England. After all, the
responsible party government scholars' model is that of the British
1 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) ("[Tjhe emergence of a strong and stable two-party

system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective
government." (quoting Davis,478 U.S. at 144-45 (O'Connor,J., concurring))).
20 For a more detailed description and analysis of the Timmons case,
see Hasen,
supra note 4, at 337-41.
2, The Court accepted the state's argument that "a candidate or
party could easily
exploit fusion as a way of associating his or its name with popular slogans and
catchphrases." Timmons, 520 U.S. at 365. It also agreed that permitting fusion would
allow "minor parties to capitalize on the popularity of another party's candidate, rather
than on their own appeal to the voters, in order to secure access to the ballot." Id. at
366. I criticize these rationales in Hasen, supra note 4, at 339. Like Justice Stevens in
his dissent, I believe that the state's asserted interest in preserving the two-party system
.appears to be the true basis for the Court's holding." Timmons, 520 U.S. at 377
(Stevens,J, dissenting).
22 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367.
23 Id.
24 See id. at 384 (SouterJ., dissenting) (stating that "[i]f it could be shown that
the
disappearance of the two-party system would undermine [political stability], and that
permitting fusion candidacies poses a substantial threat to the two-party scheme, there
might well be a sufficient predicate for recognizing the constitutionality" of
Minnesota's fusion ban).
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party system, "supposedly disciplined and cohesive, and unhampered
by constitutional barriers in their governing function."'
XWhether or not the scholars' model historically came close to
representing reality in the United States or Great Britain, the model
has ignored fundamental and permanent changes to the nature of
campaigning since the 1960s that have drastically altered the
relationship among parties, candidates, and the voters.
To
understand these changes, it is useful to begin ith political scientist
V.0. Key's conception of the major parties as constituting three
distinct elements: • the party organization,
the party-in-government,
265
and the party-in-the-electorate.
The nature of party organizations, such as the Democratic
National Committee, has changed dramatically over time." Through
the end of the nineteenth century, elections were party-centered
affairs. Before the rise of the secret ballot at the end of the
nineteenth century, each party printed up its own colored ballots,
making it easy to determine the party allegiance of each voter and
making it difficult for voters to do anything but vote a straight party
ticket.
Even after the arrival of the secret ballot, campaigns remained
party-centered because they were labor intensive. Turnout drives in
major cities depended upon the workings of political machines,
leading to the rise of political patronage.
Although some changes in party organizations may be traced to
party reforms in the Progressive Era-including the important change
to the direct primary discussed in Part LC below-the most dramatic
changes in the nature of party organizations came with technologydriven changes in campaigning. Television allowed major candidates
to introduce themselves and their ideas to voters directly, lessening
the need for a party cue. ' R Television is an expensive medium that

DAN'ID E. PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE PARTIES 103 (1984).
Considerable
controversy remains over whether the British party system ever lived up to this ideal.
So. Exron M. Kirkpatrick, -Toward a More Responsible, Two-Party System" . PoliticalScience,
Porl Scine,, or Pseudo-Science?, 65 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 965, 974-76 (1971) (questioning
the view that the British party system is the ultimate embodiment of the responsible
party model).
S KEY, supra note 10, at 163-65 (setting forth multiple meanings of the term
Se
"political party").
_,7For relevant citations, see Hasen,
supra note 4, at 350-55.
" In a 1998 survey, forty-one percent of California voters named television as the
srource of their political information. Mark Baldassare, Context and Setting: The Mood of
tit, Californa Ebrtorate, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE:

CALIFORNIA'S
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takes the place of party labor. These combined effects have moved
campaigns from labor-intensive activities to capital-intensive ones.!'
Even politicians running for lower-level offices run capital-intensive
campaigns, spending much of their money on direct mail."'
In response to candidates' need for capital and media savvy over
labor, party organizations have transformed themselves into
fundraising machines and campaign consultants. Party organizations
play an increasingly important role as the "party in service to its
candidates."31
The national Democratic and Republican party
organizations are at the height of their power, raising ever-increasing
amounts of money used to promote the candidates.
As party organizations have surged in importance in their new
role as campaign consultants and fundraisers, the party-ingovernment, members of the same party serving in the legislature,
appears to have strengthened as well, at least on the national level.
One important measure of party-in-government strength is the extent
to which party members vote together in Congress. Party cohesion or
"unity scores" have been quite high, reaching unprecedented levels in
1994 and hovering around eighty percent for both parties in both
chambers. 2
In contrast to the rise of these other two elements of the parties,
the party-in-the-electorate has died all but in name. This is not merely
because patronage employment has declined over time, lessening the
connection between party organizations and the voters who register
with the parties. Voters are also both less likely to have strong
identification with parties and more likely to see the parties as
irrelevant. 33 Only seven percent of Americans reported giving money

E.Cain and Elisabeth R. Gerber eds.,
forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 94, 102-03) [hereinafter VOTING AT THE POLITICAL
EXPERIMENT WITH THE BLANKET PRIMARY (Bruce
FAULT LINE].

New Deal legislation also lessened voter demand for political patronage jobs.
See ALDRICH, supra note 15, at 268 ("New Deal legislation took over by policy and
through entitlement the kinds of services local machines had once made available to
woo support on election day.").
30See Hasen, supra note 4, at 352 n.125 (noting that House candidates spend their
money on the expensive medium of direct mail advertising).
31 ALDRICH, supra note 15, at 269.
3 Id. at 176; see also Barbara Sinclair, Parties in Congress: New Roles
and Leadership
29

Trends, in THE PARTIES RESPOND: CHANGES IN AMERICAN PARTIES AND CAMPAIGNS 299,
303 (L. Sandy Maisel ed., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter THE PARTIES RESPOND] (charting
the significant increase of ideological cohesion in the Democratic House membership
during the 1980s and early 1990s).
33 See MARTIN P. WATrENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES,
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to help a party or candidate in either of the last two elections,m and
only about two percent reported working for a party or candidate in
the same period.' Almost three-quarters of Americans reported not
being contacted by one of the major political parties during
campaigns in the same period. Aldrich has concluded that we no
longer have "parties-in-the-electorate." 7 We now have merely the
"party in service to the candidate."8
Given these fundamental changes, it is surprising that responsible
party government scholars (and the Supreme Court, which currently
seems to share their viewpoint) have not reconsidered whether the
two-party system can play the important democratizing role with which
it has been charged.
Despite the repeated claim that the two-party system promotes
political stability, this contention remains unproven. Admittedly, the
United States is a two-party system and politics here has been relatively
stable. " Nevertheless, it is not clear that the two-party system causes
stability. Proof of instability in countries with many parties does not
itself establish that the two-party system leads to stability. Indeed,
Ronald Rogowski, in his examination of empirical evidence across
countries, concludes that proportional representation, which tends
toward multiple party systems, "best guarantees the stability of
democratic policy.""

1952-1984, at 23, 46 (1986) (noting the declining salience of political parties in the
American political process); see also ALDRICH, supra note 15, at 248-52 (discussing
Wattenberg's arguments). The extent to which independent voters really lean towards
one political party or the other appears to be overstated. See Steven Greene, The
PwJhologicalSouras of Partisan-LeaningIndependence, 28 AM. POL. Q. 511, 530 (2000)
("[W]hen addressing general attitudes toward the parties and political independence,
leaners should most appropriately be considered as independents. Leaners, in both
their level of independent social identity as well as their attitudes toward parties in
general, are indistinguishable from pure independents.").
National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, Univ. of Mich., The NES
Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, 1995-1998, at http://
i'..umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab6b_5.htm (last visitedJan. 20, 2001).
....
Id. at http://iiv.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab6b_3.htm
(last
xisitedJan. 20, 2001).
Id. at http://wv.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab6c-la.htm
(last
visitudJan. 20, 2001).
,7 ALDRICH, supra note
15, at 269.
Id.
By "stable," I mean simply that we have peaceful, orderly transitions from one
government to the next.
41 Ronald Rogowski, Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions,
41 INT'L ORG.
203, 209 (1987).
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The responsible party government scholars' claim that the twoparty system prevents interest group politics fares poorly in the era of
capital-intensive campaigns. The parties' activities in raising unprecedented amounts of largely unregulated "soft money" belie the antifactionalist contention.
The current system is little more than
legalized money laundering:
Candidates for federal office, who
otherwise would be limited by the Federal Election Campaign Act
from raising more than $1,000 from individuals or $5,000 from a
political action committee per election, 4' raise huge amounts of soft
money from corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals. The
parties serve as conduits for the sale of access by politicians for money
to benefit their campaigns. At the very least, the prevalence of soft
money raises serious questions about whether the parties are allencompassing coalitions preventing interest groups from seeking
their narrow agendas.
Only the voting cue benefit of political parties remains as a
legitimate reason to favor the two-party system. The voting cue has
declined in vitality: Since 1960, roughly one-third of all voters, on
average, have split their votes between parties, as compared with only
about three percent in 1900.41 Split-ticket voters must be relying upon
something other than party name in choosing candidates.
Nonetheless, many of the voters who are not splitting their tickets may
rely upon little more than the "D" or "R" next to a candidate's name,
and some of the ticket-splitters probably use the party voting cue for
most races about which they have little information.
The voting cue benefit of the two-party system alone, however,
does not necessarily justify laws burdening the First Amendment rights
of third parties. As I have argued in my analysis of Timmons," if the
Supreme Court were concerned about the voting cue, it should have
struck down, rather than upheld, Minnesota's antifusion law. Fusion
prevents candidates from having more than one party label, thereby
limiting information available to voters. A candidate with two-party
41 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,

2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a) (1) (A) & (a) (2) (A)

(1994).

42 For an in-depth look at the legal and policy issues surrounding soft
money, see
DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION Lkw-CASES AND MATERALS

(2d ed. forthcoming 2001) (manuscript ch. 16).
43 See Morris P. Fiorina, The Electorate at the Polls in the 1990s,
in THE PARTIES
RESPOND, supra note 32, at 123, 126 (containing a table setting forth percentages of
congressional districts carried by House and presidential candidates of the different
parties for the period 1900-1992).
44 See Hasen, supra note 4, at 361-62 (criticizing
the Court's decision in Timmons).
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labels (such as "Democrat" and "Liberal") sends a different cue than a
candidate with only one (such as "Democrat"); the former is likely to
be to the left of the latter. Antifusion laws prevent ballots from
providing more precise voting cues.
The above analysis represents an argument that the two-party
system does not deserve special protection by the courts, except
perhaps when necessary to preserve the voting cue.5 The two-party
s}stem also does not need protection from the rights of minor parties
and candidates. '
Politicians have every incentive to join one of the two major
parties. Political parties provide important organizational advantages
to candidates, including economies of scale in campaigning and a
party label that is useful to voters as a cue. They also provide ways for
politicians to make long-term agreements to vote as a bloc in order to
pass legislation that each politician individually favors. Unsurprisingly, virtually all state legislators and members of Congress are
Democrats or Republicans.
The preceding argument explains why politicians will join parties,
but why only two parties? The answer lies in our system of elections,
in which the winner is the candidate getting the most votes in a singleround election. "Duverger's Law" is the name that political scientists
have given to the proposition that "first-past-the-post" or "plurality"
voting systems lead to the emergence of a two-party system. s In
contrast, proportional representation systems are associated more
with multiparty democracies.
Scholars have set forth a number of causal mechanisms for
explaining Duverger's Law. One of the more persuasive arguments,
put forward by Aldrich and Bianco, is that the two-party system
)"I find it hard to think of an example where the voting cue would be enhanced
specifically by a two-party, rather than a multiparty, system.
;, For a more detailed presentation of this argument, see Hasen, supra note 4, at
362-71.

P Ste id. at 366 (reporting that only
one member of the 105th Congress and 0.24%
of state legislators elected in partisan elections were neither Democrats nor
Republicans).
1 Duverger was a French political scientist who made this claim in
MAURICE

DUVERGER, POLITICA.L P, TIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN

STATE 217 (Barbara North & Robert North trans., Methuen & Co. 3d ed. 1969) (1951)
("iThe simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system."). Duverger
u'as not the first to note the relationship, see William H. Riker, The Two-Party System and
Dnvogear' Law: An Essay on the History of PoliticalScience, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 753, 75458 (1982) (tracing pre-Duverger history of idea), but he was the first to call it a "law."
DUVERGER, supra,at 217.
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endures because politicians desire long and successful careers.
Rational politicians recognize the "importance of affiliating with a
party with a high probability of success for current and future
contests, '49 which, given the voting system in the United States, are the
two major political parties. Given this evidence, it is difficult to
imagine any election laws that would do less than eliminate plurality
voting or single-member districts, seriously undermining the two-party
system.
C. Jones and the Weak Casefor MajorParty Control
of the Form ofDirect Primary
The analysis in Parts L.A and I.B demonstrates that the
conventional wisdom accepted by the responsible party government
scholars and by a majority of the Supreme Court is at least unproven
and likely flawed. States should not be allowed to discriminate against
minor parties to favor the two-party system unless they can put forward
more evidence of the system's benefits than the last generation of
political scientists has been able to do.
Jones presents a more difficult issue, because there the state did
not defend a law burdening third parties on grounds that it promotes
the two-party system. Instead, the major parties themselves asserted
First Amendment rights to association against a state law, passed by
initiative, establishing a blanket primary. The major parties' First
Amendment argument in a nutshell was that each party, as a private
association, has the right to determine the rules for choosing which
candidate will carry the party label in the fall election.
At first blush, the argument looks convincing; indeed, seven of the
nine Supreme Court justices agreed that the state of California could
not impose a blanket primary on the parties without their consent. A
closer look at the issue, however, demonstrates that the First
Amendment claim is much weaker than it initially appears.
I begin by recognizing that party organizations should have First
Amendment rights of speech and association when they are
conducting their own internal affairs. Thus, the Supreme Court was
correct in the 1989 Eu case in striking down a California law
preventing political parties from endorsing candidates in primary

9 John H. Aldrich & William T. Bianco, A Game-Theoretic
Model of Party Affiliation of
Candidates and Office Holders, 16 MATHEMATICAL COMPUTER MODELING 103, 116
(1992).
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elections."' Similarly, states should not be allowed to dictate the
internal governance structure of the parties, as California tried to do
in Eu by deciding that chairs of the state political parties had to
alternate between residents of Northern California and Southern
California. " If other private organizations have the right to endorse
candidates and structure their internal affairs, there is no reason to
deny political parties the same constitutional protection'
The same First Amendment rights are not, however, at stake when
we consider the parties' direct involvement in the electoral process,
such as participation in political primaries. To understand why,
consider the following hypothetical situation. The people of the state
of Pacifica, through initiative, decide that the issue of abortion is such
a vital and strongly contested issue in the state that it is important for
voters to know where all candidates stand on the issue. Accordingly,
the initiative abolishes partisan primaries' and establishes a new kind
of primary. For purposes of the primary, voters get to register as
either "pro-choice" or "anti-abortion." Candidates similarly identify
themselves on the ballot as either "pro-choice" or "anti-abortion."
"Pro-choice" voters get to choose among the "pro-choice" candidates,
and "anti-abortion" voters get to choose among the "anti-abortion"
candidates, with the top vote-getter in each category appearing on the
general election ballot.5
In response to this new law, two
organizations develop. The first, intending to help "pro-choice"
candidates, is called the Pacifica Abortion Rights Action League

Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989).
Id. at 232-33.
Lowenstein disagrees ith this assessment of Eu, claiming that courts should not
intervene in what are essentially "intraparty" disputes between the party in government
(the California state legislature controlled by Democrats in the case of Eu) and the
Democratic party organization. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major
Politi,-alParts: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1786 (1993). Lowenstein
acknowledges that "a part) faction, dominant in the legislature, conceivably could
adopt rules so flagrantly discriminatory or oppressive that judicial intervention would
be appropriate," but he argues that the rules at issue in Eu "certainly do not come
cl.e" to that kind of oppression. Id.
' Party organizations could still endorse candidates, but the party label would not
appear on the ballot and primaries would not be conducted along party lines.
Certainly abolition of the partisan primary is constitutional because parties have no
entitlement to such a primary. The Supreme Court in Jones observed that California
could enact a nonpartisan primary to reach its goals of moderation ithout infringing
on the First Amendment rights of political parties. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2414.
I To avoid potential constitutional problems with the rights of minor parties and
independent candidates, assume that independents and third-party candidates may
also appear on the general election ballot if they obtain enough petition signatures.
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(PARAL). The second, intending to help "anti-abortion" candidates,
is called the Pacifica Right to Life Committee (PRLC). PARAL and
PRLC are private associations with their own rules of internal
governance.
A few years later, the voters of Pacifica decide that the primary
process established by initiative is producing candidates that are too
extreme on the abortion issue. During the primaries, those voters
who feel most strongly one way or the other on the abortion issue turn
out to vote and tend to choose candidates who have the strongest
positions on this issue as well. This leaves voters without a moderate
choice on the abortion issue in the general election.
Accordingly, the voters pass a new initiative continuing the
procedure whereby candidates identify themselves on the primary
ballot as either "pro-choice" or "anti-abortion" and voters register in
one category or the other. Under the new initiative, however,
voters-regardless of whether they register as "pro-choice" or "antiabortion"-may vote for a candidate in either primary. The winners
in each category still go on to the general election. The likely effect of
this new initiative is the election of candidates more moderate on the
issue of abortion.'
After the initiative passes, PARAL and PRLC bring suit,
contending that the initiative violates their First Amendment right to
association. Surely they would lose their First Amendment challenge.
Nothing in the new initiative prevents these groups from endorsing
candidates or interferes with their internal governance. The groups
have as much autonomy as they wish. Neither group may be happy
that the new initiative leads to candidates more moderate on the issue
55Gerber explains why the blanket primary may lead to more moderate
candidates running for office: "By opening participation in the primary to voters
outside a candidate's party, candidates are forced to compete for the ideological
center of the electorate. Candidates with more moderate positions, or who can move
to the center, receive greater support and prevail." Elisabeth R.Gerber, Strategic Voting
and CandidatePolicy Positions, in VOTING AT THE POLITIcAL FAULT LINE, supra note 28

(manuscript at 291, 291). Gerber explains that opponents of the blanket primary
claimed that it advantages extremist candidates because it allows "'raiding' or
'sabotage' by ideologically motivated partisans.
These voters nominate weak
candidates in the other party and their own ideologically polar candidate prevails." Id.
at 292. Examining the empirical evidence in light of the June 1998 California blanket
primary, Gerber found "some evidence for the moderation hypothesis and little
evidence for the polarization hypothesis." Id. at 314. For additional evidence across
states, see Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primaqy Election Systems and
Representation, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 304 (1998), summarizing evidence that
participation by a wider spectrum of the electorate leads to the election of more
moderate candidates.
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of abortion. The initiative therefore may be bad policy, but that
cannot serve as the basis for their First Amendment challenge.
Why is the situation of the major parties in California's blanket
primary any different?
Like the fictitious organizations in my
hypothetical, the California Democratic and Republican parties have
not been told how to run their organizations. Nor does anything
prevent these organizations from endorsing candidates. The party
organizations, like PARAL and PRLC, have as much autonomy as they
wish, though they too may be upset that the new initiative leads to
candidates being more moderate on issues important to the parties.
Proponents of party autonomy may make three arguments to
distinguish my hypothetical situation from the situation of the major
parties in Jones. First, they may argue that in the hypothetical, voters
in the general election choose a candidate identified simply as "prochoice" or "anti-abortion," not as the "PARAL" or "PRLC" candidate.
In California, by contrast, voters in the general election would choose
a candidate dubbed the "Democratic" or "Republican" nominee of
the party. Thus, the candidate is identified by the party organization's
party label.
This difference, while real, should not be constitutionally
significant. Voters and members of the party organization all
understand that the voters, not members of the party organization,
are choosing the candidate who appears on the general election ballot
using the "Democratic" or "Republican" party label. It has been this
way since the Progressive movement successfully pushed for the
adoption of the direct primary, whereby voters, rather than party
organization members, choose party nominees.
Thus, the majority in Jones was incorrect to analogize the situation
of the party organizations to the parade organizers in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.5 In Hurley, the
Supreme Court held that organizers of a parade could not be forced
by state law to include parade participants with whom the organizers
disagreed politically. 7 The Court held that such forced association
violates the First Amendment.58 In a political primary, however, the
choice of candidate is that of the voters, not of the party organization.
The party organization is not forced to associate with the nominee

515 U.S. 557 (1995), cited with approval inJones, 120 S. Ct. at 2412.
Hurl',, 515 U.S. at 578.
-, Id. at 581 ("Our holding today rests ... on the Nation's commitment to protect
freedom of speech.").
,7
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chosen by the voters: The party organization needs neither to work
for nor to endorse the nominee, though it often will do so.ft
Moreover, the blanket primary system is not the only one in which
those eligible to vote for party candidates may include more than
those people who have had a longstanding affiliation with the party.
In some open primary states, for example, voters choose on the day of
the election whether to affiliate with the Democratic or the
Republican party in order to get a ballot with the names of one party's
candidates or the other's." Even in states with completely closed
primaries, where one must register in advance for one party or the
other and can vote only in that party's primary, the party
organizations have no control over who registers with each party and
how party registrants vote.6'
Given how easy it is for voters across the range of primary types to
affiliate with a political party solely for the purpose of voting in the
primary, it rings hollow for the parties to single out the blanket
primary as somehow changing or undermining the essence of the

In Eu, the Court recognized that the right of parties not to endorse candidates
was so important because it is possible for a candidate "with views antithetical to those
of her party nevetheless to win its primary." Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 217. The Court noted that in 1980, a Grand Dragon of the Ku
Klux Klan named Tom Metzger won the Democratic Party's nomination to Congress
from the San Diego area. Id. at 217 n.4. In a case involving another avowed white
supremacist, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Georgia Republican Party had the right to keep candidate David Duke's name off the
ballot in the Georgia presidential primary under its rights of political association. Set,
Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that exclusion did not violate
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the candidate and his supporters). For
reasons explained in the text above, I believe the Court of Appeals was incorrect in
finding that the party has such a right.
0 Those voters must vote for all candidates in one party, in contrast to voters in
the blanket primary, who may vote, for example, in the Democratic primary for
governor and the Republican primary for attorney general. The Supreme Court in
Jones refused to decide whether a state could impose an open primary on a political
party without its consent. 120 S. Ct. at 2410 n.8. The logic of Jones, however, implies
that a state may not do so. See id. at 2420 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is surely a
danger that open primaries will fare no better against a First Amendment challenge
than blanket primaries have."); see also DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN & RIcHARD L. HASEN,
ELECTION LAW, 2000-2001 SUPPLEMENT 51 (2000) (arguing that Jones and an earlier
Supreme Court case "give the parties rather than the state legislatures the last word"
on the form of party primary, but noting that "the state legislature usually will provide
for the type of primary favored by the major parties").
61 Ever since the White Primay Cases, it has been unconstitutional for
parties to
exclude people from the vote on the basis of race. See DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN,
ELECTION LAw 318-21 (1995) (detailing the history of the obligations of political
parties under the Constitution).
59
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party or capturing the party's message." To the extent that members
of part), organizations object to certain voters participating in the
decision over who bears the "Democratic" or "Republican" label, they
are really arguing against the direct primary itself and in favor of
other systems of choosing party nominees, such as caucuses.63
Yet the Supreme Court in Jones rejected the idea that the direct
primary itself is unconstitutional: "We have considered it 'too plain
for argument,'... that a State may require parties to use the primary
format for selecting their nominees, in order to assure that intraparty
competition is resolved in a democratic fashion."" From there, it
should logically have followed that the state could decide how voting
in the direct primary should be conducted. So long as no one
requires a party organization to endorse or otherwise affiliate with a
particular candidate, there should be no constitutional problem.
A second and related argument distinguishing my hypothetical
from the Jones case is that voters in the hypothetical merely label
themselves as "pro-choice" or "anti-abortion" rather than as members
of PARAL or PRLC; in contrast, voters in the traditional primary
identify themselves as members of the parties by registering as a
"Democrat" or "Republican." Voters thus 'Join" each part), as the
"party-in-the-electorate" to instruct the party organization regarding
who the party nominee should be; voters in my hypothetical do not
join PARAL or PRLC to instruct each organization how to vote.
Under this view (and the view of the majority in Jones), the
primary election is a "party affair."6' The blanket primary, by allowing
""SeJones, 120 S. Ct. at 2421 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("In my view, an empirically
debatable assumption about the relative number and effect of likely crossover voters in

a blanket primary, as opposed to an open primary or a nominally closed primary with
only a brief preregistration requirement, is too thin a reed to support a credible First
Amendment distinction."); Brennan Center Brief, supra note 6,at 7 ("An empirically
debatable assumption about the relative number of likely crossover voters in an open

primary, as opposed to a blanket primary, is, however, a thin reed on which to base a
First Amendment distinction.").
, e Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 1768 ("Recognizing that there is
very little

popular sentiment for eliminating primaries, some party renewal advocates have
argued that laws requiring primaries are unconstitutional."). The move to the direct
primary began as a progressive reform in 1903 and was adopted by most states by the
1920s. Hasen, supra note 4, at 353 n.129 (citing WALTER DEAN BURNHAi, CRITIcAL
ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 75 (1970)).

,.tJones, 120 S. Ct. at 2407; see also Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting a challenge to California's direct primary).
;Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2407 n.4 (disputing the idea that an election is solely a
'public affair" and stating that "when the election determines a party's nominee it is a
part), affair as well").
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non-party members to participate in the party's primary, interferes
with the party's right to determine its own candidates. This argument
fails, however, because it relies upon the myth that the party-in-theelectorate still exists and that party registration remains a significant
associative act.
In fact, party registration is the functional equivalent of simply
identifying oneself as "pro-choice" or "anti-abortion" as a means of
voting in Pacifica's primary. Generally one chooses "Democrat" if one
is more liberal or if one's parents were registered as Democrats and
"Republican" if one is more conservative or if one's parents were
registered as Republicans.66 It is a way to signal to the parties that one
wants to receive political information from the more appropriate
point on the political spectrum.
As noted in Part I.B, the party-in-the-electorate no longer exists as
anything more than a political science construct; one does not really
'join" a party by registering to vote with a party affiliation. Few voters
have contact with, much less contribute time or money to, the
political parties with whom they register. Voters are consumers who
choose candidates in elections, with some relying upon the party label
as a useful shortcut to discern the candidates' likely views of public
policy. Thus, registering with a party is no more of a significant
associational fact for First Amendment purposes than labeling oneself
as "pro-choice" or "anti-abortion" in my Pacifica hypothetical.
Finally, one might argue that the blanket primary is
constitutionally distinguishable from my hypothetical situation
because parties are special kinds of organizations serving important
societal goals, not single interest groups like PARAL or PRLC. Parties,
therefore, are entitled to greater First Amendment protection than
would be afforded to other private associations like PARAL or PRLC.
Under this argument, the blanket primary, by leading to the election
of more moderate candidates, endangers the parties' special role by
blurring party lines.
As a matter of policy, there may be something to the argument
that the blanket primary is a bad idea. Although I have rejected the
political stability argument for the two-party system as unproven and
the antifactionalism argument for the two-party system as incorrect, I
have acknowledged that the voting cue remains important for a
number of voters who pay little attention to politics. As more

66

See FRANKJ. SORAUF & PAUL ALLEN BECK, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA

(6th ed. 1988) (discussing sources of voter party identification).
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moderate candidates are chosen, the voting cue may become less
relevant. In addition, evidence from the California experience
suggests that the blanket primary helps incumbents even more to
reelection.
This is, however, a policy argument against adopting the blanket
primary. As a matter of policy there may be good reasons to oppose
the blanket primary, but a policy argument is not a First Amendment
argument. The state, and particularly voters through the initiative
process, should be allowed to choose whether to take a chance on
losing an), societal benefits that might accompany a strong two-party
system in order to get other benefits such as the election of more
moderate candidates. Evidence suggests that the blanket primary
also may help the position of Latinos and other minorities.69 It also
may boost turnout, at least slightly.]
Perhaps the Supreme Court could have turned this policy
argument into a constitutional one." The Court could have said (but
",So- Bruce E. Cain & Elisabeth R. Gerber, Conclusion, in VOTING
AT THE
POLITIcAL FivLT LINE, supra note 28 (manuscript at 520, 534) (noting the "enhanced
incumbency effect" from the blanket primary).
I It exen could be supported on partisan grounds. Moderate
Republican
Congressman Tom Campbell of California actively worked toward the passage of the
blanket primary initiative after losing to a more conservative candidate in the
Republican primary for U.S. Senate. Campbell believed that Republicans would do
better under an open primary because candidates chosen there would be more likely
to appeal to the majority of voters in the general election, and not just to a majority of
Republican primary voters. See Brian J. Gaines & Wendy K. Tam Cho, Crossover Voting
B,[,nn the Blanktkd: Prinaries Versus Parties in Calfornia Histoiy, in VOTING AT THE
POLITICAkL FAULT LINE, supra note 28 (manuscript at 14, 4143) (describing
endorsements of Proposition 198 by political figures and their motivations).
"'S , Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, Targets of Opportunity: California's
Blanket Pnmary and the Political Representation of Latinos, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL
FULTLI LINE, supra note 28 (manuscript at 376, 377) (suggesting that "the switch to the
blanket primary has already begun to bear fruit for Latino political interests"); see also
Miki Caul & Katherine Tate, Thinner Ranks: Women Candidates and California'sBlanket
Prinar, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE, supra note 28 (manuscript at 355,
367) (finding no evidence supporting the thesis that the blanket primary has hurt the
election of women candidates).
See Wendy K. Tam Cho & Brian J. Gaines, Candidates, Donors, and Voters in
Califouria\ First Blanket-PrimaqyElections, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE, supra

note 28 (manuscript at 249, 256) (attributing a 2.4% turnout boost in voter
participation to the blanket primary).
For a strong argument that the courts focus on the role of parties in democracy
rather than the constitutional text in adjudicating the claim in Proposition 198, see
Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational
Fr,,doms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001). For an
argument that parties should not enjoy "a preferred constitutional position under the
First Amendment," see Frank J. Sorauf, Strength Through Financial Wizardry:
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did go so far in Jones to say) that parties are entitled to special First
Amendment rights. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, this would
be a difficult argument for the current Court to make. There is
nothing in the text of the Constitution giving parties special First
Amendment rights; indeed, parties are not mentioned at all because
parties as we now know them did not exist at the time of the writing of
the Constitution. 72 The Court certainly could have done so less
explicitly, however. My reading of the Court's patronage cases is that,
although the Court framed those cases as involving the First
Amendment rights of employees not to affiliate with a political party,
it was less concerned with the First Amendment than it was with
ending the corruption that has been associated with political
patronage.7 3
If the Court, however, is going to accept-explicitly or implicitlypolicy arguments as a means of adjudicating First Amendment rights,
it should also look closely at the extent of the evidence supporting the
policy arguments. The evidence we have on the effect of the form in
which primary elections are held on the strength of parties does not
demonstrate that parties are in great danger from more open
primaries. Despite the existence of the blanket primary in the State of
Washington for many years, the Republican Party there is among the
strongest party organizations in the nation. More generally, during
the same period that almost half of the states had open or blanket
primaries, party cohesion in Congress reached high levels
unprecedented in American history. It appears that the openness of
the primaries has not caused candidates to become so moderate that

Problems and Dilemmas for the Major American Parties 18 (unpublished paper
prepared for delivery at the 2000 annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review), stating that "it is
a position tantamount to arguing that, of all political actors and organizations, the
parties must enjoy absolute First Amendment protection, that they alone must be
protected by the Amendment from any limiting legislation."
712 See Larry Kramer, After the Founding:
Political Parties and the Constitution
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing for constitutional recognition
of political parties).
73 See Richard L.

Hasen, Patronage, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 1885, 1886 (Leonard Levy et al., eds., 2d ed. 2000) ("Though the

debate over the constitutionality of patronage turns in part upon the Justices' varied
beliefs about how coercive or unfair a party affiliation requirement is to government
employees or contractors, the most contentious issue appears to be whether patronage
practices support a strong, democratic government.").
74 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, app. at 659 n.29 (9th Cir. 1999),
rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).
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they cannot engage in party-line voting most of the time. 7'
Stating that the parties should not have a constitutional right to
veto the state's choice of primary would not at all mean that the
parties would be without influence over the choice. In fact, the
parties already have pervasive influence over the choice. In those
states without the initiative process, the state legislature can decide on
the form of the primary or at least can propose a state constitutional
amendment to change the form of the primary. Almost all the
members of almost every state legislature are Democrats and
Republicans, who likely will be amenable to their party leadership's
choice of primary.
Even in states with the initiative process, parties can try to
convince voters not to adopt more open primaries. Parties can
themselves propose initiatives to close the primaries. In California,
the Democratic and Republican parties did not seriously contest
Proposition 198, the initiative establishing the blanket primary. They
spent almost nothing and devoted very few resources to the issue;
whereas, they participated heavily in the initiative process when they
saw partisan electoral advantage. For example, Republicans spent
heavily in support of an anti-affirmative action initiative, and
Democrats spent heavily in opposing an anti-welfare reform initiative.
Had the parties fought Proposition 198, they might have been
successful.'
If anything, the evidence of the two major parties' pervasive
control over the political process should militate toward lesser, rather
than greater, First Amendment protection for the parties in the
electoral process. The parties have the political means to protect
themselves; as Lowenstein has remarked, the parties are "grown-ups"
who should be expected to take care of themselves.
Court protection of the major political parties is appropriate in
one situation involving the electoral process: Courts should protect a
major party when the other major party uses its control over the state

Haeberle found that, when controlling for other factors, the openness of the
primary had no effect on the party cohesion scores of members of Congress. Steven H.
Haeberle, Closed Pfinariesand Partv Support in Congress, 13 AMNi.
POL. Q. 341, 350 (1985).
For a detailed look at the California parties' strategies regarding Proposition
198, see Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative(and lice Versa), 100 COLUM. L. REv.
731, 745-48 (2000), demonstrating through an examination of Proposition 198 how
the parties are still behind the learning curve on countering initiatives that regulate
the parties themselves.
Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 1790.
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legislature to engage in an act of unfair competition.7 This situation1
is illustrated by the case of Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut."
In Tashjian, the Connecticut Legislature, controlled by the
Democratic Party, prevented the Republican Party from opening up
their primaries to independent voters. Court scrutiny was appropriate
in Tashjianbecause there the state, controlled by one major party, was
discriminating against the other party for partisan advantage," much
like a partisan gerrymandering claim under Davis v. Bandemer. '
Scrutiny was not appropriate, however, on grounds that the
Connecticut law infringed upon the Republican Party's right to
autonomy.
Professor Cain's two primary errors (pun intended) in his wellargued article in this volume are (1) his belief that a contrary ruling in
Jones would have locked in a hypercentrist electoral process," and (2)
his view that the state must come forward with a compelling interest to
justify its choice of a blanket primary.8' The first belief is incorrect
because voters would have retained the right to overturn Proposition
198 in a subsequent election, a point recognized by the lower courts
in Jones.14 Professor Cain laments the tyranny of the majority over the
minority, terming it "majority abuse,"' 5 but let us not forget that this
"minority" is really the major political parties who remain the
dominant political forces in the state. As I have detailed elsewhere,"'

78Of course, when voters act through the initiative process as they did in Jones, we

can safely ignore the problem.
79479 U.S. 208 (1986).
80Id. As Lowenstein points out, however, there might be good policy reasons for
the courts to reject the Republican claims in such a case. See Lowenstein, supra note
52, at 1789-90 (discussing reasons for the Court to intervene "at the behest of a

minority party that complains of a provision affecting both parties uniformly").
81478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Bruce E. Cain, Party Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral Competition, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 793, 795 (2001).
8 Id.
84 [T] he court does not decide whether a blanket primary is a good idea; it may
82

prove to be a bad idea, in which case the people of the State presumably will act

to reform the system in the future as they have in the past. Nor does the court
decide whether the voters were correct in concluding that a more
representative and participatory system is desirable at this time in the State's
history or whether it is wise to weaken the parties by some degree to further the
goals of representativeness and participation. These important questions are

for the people of the State to decide.
Jones, 169 F.3d 646, app. at 662 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).
85 Cain, supra note 82, at 808.
86 Hasen, supra note 76, at 747-48.
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the parties in California used numerous devices to circumvent
Proposition 198, and easily could have placed a measure on the ballot
to overturn it and devoted resources toward its repeal.s "Lock-in"
occurs when political arrangements are immune from change by the
political process; the blanket primary story in California does not fit
that category.
Professor Cain's second error is his assumption that the state must
come forward with a "compelling interest" to justify its (perhaps
misguided) policy choice toward candidate moderation.
His
argument presupposes a violation of rights; otherwise, it is difficult to
see why the government is not free to choose moderation. Cain does
not hang his hat on a rights-based approach, however, preferring
instead a "functional" view of the political process. Such a position is
certainly defensible, "s but then we need to cut the discussion of
compelling interests and simply argue over what is the best policy. In
essence, what Professor Cain is advocating is that courts bias outcomes
toward the status quo because the status quo represents good political
process. Unless Professor Cain is that political scientist he describes
who has received divine guidance on the best form of democratic
government," I do not see why his view rather than a view of the
majority of state voters should get enshrined in constitutional
doctrine. It seems that he should bear the burden of producing
compelling evidence that the voters' choice will harm democracy in
the long term.
M

II. THE CASE FOR COURT PROTECTION OF MINOR PARTIES
Part I argued that neither the "two-party system" nor the
,7 In mny Columbia Law Review article, I explain
how the parties did the former in
convincing the California legislature to place Proposition 3 on the ballot.
Proposition 3 would have reversed the blanket primary for the presidential nomination
process. The parties then devoted virtually no resources toward passing it, and
Proposition 3 failed. See id. The parties then got around the blanket primary for the
presidential nomination process through legislation passed in the California
legislature requiring the coding of ballots by voters' party affiliation, thereby allowing
parties to ignore the results of the blanket primary.
S' Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by "ElectionLaw" Alone, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REX'. 1173, 1183 (1999) ("[T]he central question is how deep into existing
practices a robust, functional, historically-awvare understanding of democracy will
penetrate."); Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 Loy LA. L. REv. 1217,
1217-18 (1999) (praising the movement of election law scholarship from a rights-based
approach "to a more pragmatic and structural view of politics as a matter of
institutional arrangements").
Cain, supra note 82, at 813.
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Democratic and Republican parties need or deserve judicial
protection most of the time. In this Part, I argue that minor parties
(and independent candidates"), in contrast to the major parties, do
deserve and need such protection.
My argument has three components. First, the government rarely
has a legitimate, much less compelling, reason to place onerous
burdens on minor parties. Second, the precarious and fragile
position of third parties justifies enhanced First Amendment
protection. Third, minor parties play an important role in our
electoral process by enriching political debate and thereby providing
an additional reason for protection.
I begin my first argument with reference to Jones. Recall that the
reason voters in California likely passed the blanket primary was to
elect more moderate candidates in the general election. As we know,
the blanket primary encourages Democratic and Republican
candidates to move to the political center. No doubt voters, in passing
the open primary, were hardly voting for it in order to promote more
moderate minor party candidacies. 9' Minor party candidates almost
never win elections in California, nor are they a political factor in the
overwhelming majority of elections. Thus, there is not much of a
government interest at stake when it comes to regulating minor
parties' primaries.
Jones, of course, was an initiative case. Much of the enacted
legislation that affects minor parties, however, is passed by legislatures,
not by the people through the initiative process. The most common
way that legislatures pass laws affecting minor parties is through the
passage of tough ballot-access requirements or related laws like the
antifusion law in Timmons.
Courts should scrutinize these requirements carefully because the
legislature that passes them is made up almost entirely of Democrats

90 Although

what I say about minor parties also applies to independent
candidates, I will simply use the term "minor parties" for the rest of this Article.
91 See Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, PoliticalReform Via the InitiativeProcess: 11l7at
Voters Think About When They Change the Rules, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE,

supra note 28 (manuscript at 55, 72) (finding that voters with strong party feelings
toward the major parties opposed the initiative and those with weak ties supported the
initiative). Interestingly, the authors found that voters registered with minor parties
were significantly more likely to support Proposition 198. Id. at 73.
92 See Christian Collet, OpennessBegets Opportunity: Minor Partiesand the First Blanket
Primary in California, in VOTING AT THE POLITICAL FAULT LINE, supra note 28
(manuscript at 326, 326) (noting the first minor party candidate since 1917 was elected
to the California state assembly in 1999).
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and Republicans, ' who have a common interest in maintaining high
barriers to entry by other parties. Casually asserted general state
interests in preventing voter "confusion" or "fatigue" should not be
taken at face value. The state does have a legitimate interest in having
a manageable ballot and electoral system, but courts should ensure
that the legislature has good empirically justified reasons for enacting
ballot-access laws and other laws affecting minor parties.
Requirements imposed on minor parties should not be permitted if
their only purpose is to entrench the two-party duopoly. Had the
Supreme Court insisted on such evidence in Timmons,5 for example,
the result might have been different. In most cases, the state has no
good reason to impose severe burdens on minor parties.
Beyond the lessened government interest in regulating minor
parties, minor parties are in much greater need of protection than the
major parties. Minor parties do not have easy recourse to the
legislature or the executive, for example, when the people act by
initiative. Minor parties are likely to be ideologically driven groups,
and sometimes their ideologies are unpopular. Enhanced judicial
review is especially appropriate for politically vulnerable groups,
termed "discrete and insular minorities."
Additionally, to the extent that courts should explicitly or
implicitly take social policy into account in evaluating First
Amendment claims, ' strong social policies support protection of
minor political parties. To understand why, we must consider the
function of minor parties in American democracy.
Minor parties generally are not formed in the United States for
the purpose of winning elections. Most minor party candidates are
well aware of Duverger's Law and have no illusions of taking office.
Nor do minor parties have much chance of displacing one of the two
major parties. The last time that such a displacement occurred was in
the 1850s, when the Republicans replaced the Whigs.i'
... Str Hasen, supra note 4, at 366 (providing statistics on how few minor
party

candidates are elected to Congress and the state legislatures).
., The Supreme Court has held that empirical evidence is not required
in such
circumstances. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986) (holding
that a requirement to make such a shouing of empirical evidence "would invariably
lead to endless court battles over the sufficiency of the 'evidence'").
Sc supra text accompanying note 44 (discussing the author's view of Timmons).
S...'supra text accompanying note 71 (arguing that the Supreme Court could
have turned a policy argument against the blanket primary into a constitutional
argument).
..7 SORUF & BECK, supra
note 66, at 35.
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Instead, minor political parties broaden the political debate. '
They raise otherwise ignored issues, prompting the major parties to
take positions on these issues. Anyone who remembers the 1992
presidential race will recognize the important role that Ross Perot
played in putting deficit reduction on the table. Perot cannot be
credited with the budget surpluses of recent years, but one wonders
whether President Clinton and the Republicans in Congress would
have made the same budgeting decisions if they had not been
influenced by Perot's discussion of these issues.
AsJustice Marshall explained in his dissenting opinion in Munro v.
Socialist Workers Party:
The minor party's often unconventional positions broaden political
debate, expand the range of issues with which the electorate is
concerned, and influence the positions of the majority, in some
instances ultimately becoming majority positions. And its very existence
provides an outlet for voters to express dissatisfaction with the
candidates or platforms of the major parties.
Given these three factors-lessened government interest in
regulation, the political vulnerability of minor parties, and the social
benefits they provide to the electoral process-greater court
protection is warranted.
Deciding precisely how much protection minor parties should
receive is a difficult question, as the Jones case illustrates. As already
mentioned, the state had little reason to subject minor parties to the
blanket primary, suggesting that it is unconstitutional not to exempt
them. On the other hand, the state, in enacting the law, did not
impose a huge burden on minor parties. It is true that in a number of
contests in California under the blanket primary, the minor parties
had their votes swamped by crossover voters.0 ° If my analysis in Part
I.C is correct, however, this factor does not interfere with minor
parties' First Amendment right to association; minor parties can
simply disavow the chosen candidate or not work toward her election.
The answer to resolving this question may turn on how the
98 As the leading text on third parties has put it:
[T]he power of third parties lies in their capacity to affect the content and
range of political discourse, and ultimately public policy, by raising issues and
options that the two major parties have ignored. In so doing, they not only
promote their cause but affect the very character of the two-party system.
STEVENJ. ROSENSTONE ETAL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA 8 (2d ed. 1996).
9 Munro, 479 U.S. at 200 (Marshall,J., dissenting).

1O0
See Collet, supra note 92, at 332-37 (discussing the impact of the blanket
primary on minor parties in 1998).
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blanket primary interferes with the social function of minor parties.
Evidence suggests that even minor party candidates moderate their
positions in blanket primaries."' This moderation lessens the chance
that minor parties will raise additional issues to be put on the table for
consideration by the major party candidates. For this reason, court
protection probably is warranted, but reasonable minds could
disagTee.
CONCLUSION

This Article has made the normative case that courts offer the
major parties too much protection and minor parties too little. It has
not considered in detail the positive question whether courts in fact
do protect major or minor political parties. Such an examination
would reveal that courts in fact are much more prone to protect major
parties than minor parties, the exact opposite result than that urged
here.
Jones continues the Supreme Court tradition of Eu and Tashjian by
protecting party organizations from infringements by the state. The
result in Jones would have been more palatable had the Court been
more thoughtful about what role the people should be allowed to play
in structuring the electoral process in an era where the party-in-theelectorate no longer exists.

1"1 Sfp id.at 341-42
(discussing how candidates in blanket primaries are
encouraged to "engage the mainstream electorate").
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